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ABSTRACT 
In this paper I offer a defence of a Russellian analysis of the referential uses of 
incomplete (mis)descriptions, in a contextual setting. With regard to the debate between a 
unificationist and an ambiguity approach to the formal treatment of definite descriptions 
(introduction), I will support the former against the latter. In 1. I explain what I mean by 
"essentially" incomplete descriptions: incomplete descriptions are context dependent 
descriptions. In 2. I examine one of the best versions of the unificationist “explicit” 
approach given by  Buchanan and Ostertag. I then show that this proposal seems unable 
to treat the normal uses of misdescriptions. I then accept the challenge of treating 
misdescriptions as a key to solving the problem of context dependent descriptions. In 3. I 
briefly discuss Michael Devitt’s and Joseph Almog’s treatments of referential 
descriptions, showing that they find it difficult to explain misdescriptions. In 4. I suggest 
an alternative approach to DD as contextuals, under a normative epistemic stance. 
Definite descriptions express (i) what a speaker should have in mind in using certain 
words in a certain context and (ii) what a normal speaker is justified in saying in a 
context, given a common basic knowledge of the lexicon. In 5. I define a procedure 
running on contextual parameters (partiality, perspective and approximation) as a means 
of representing the role of pragmatics as a filter for semantic interpretation. In 6. I defend 
my procedural approach against possible objections concerning the problem of the 
boundaries between semantics and pragmatics, relying on the distinction between 
semantics and theory of meaning.1 
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Introduction: The debate between unificationism and ambiguity thesis 
 
In the few years since the centenary celebration of "On Denoting", the discussion on 
definite descriptions has generated a greater number of papers than the total of those 
                                                
1 The paper was presented at the ESAP Conference in Krakow 2007 and some of its main ideas were 
presented in 2010 at a seminar at the University of Bologna and at a Conference on Truth in Turin 2010; I 
wish to thank  the participants for many useful remarks and questions, in particular: Andrea Bianchi, John 
McFarlane, Paolo Leonardi, Sebastiano Moruzzi, Francois Recanati, Jason Stanley and Zoltan Szabo. I 
wish to thank Filippo Domaneschi, Diego Marconi, Andrea Marino, Carlotta Pavese and Massimiliano 
Vignolo who have read a previous version of the paper, giving relevant suggestions. Thanks also to two 
anonymous referees for their insistence in pressing me to clarify obscure passages and to the students in 
Reykjavick where in 2005 I gave several lectures on definite descriptions, which served as the origin of this 
work.  
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written on the topic in the one hundred years after 1905. This abundance of material has 
concerned many problems in Russell’s theory.2 Three of the main problems are (i) the 
place of incomplete descriptions, that is definite descriptions like “the table” which are 
unable to define a unique object in the world; (ii) the distinction between referential and 
attributive uses of definite descriptions; (iii) the apparently normal use of 
misdescriptions, that is literally false descriptions which succeed in individuating the 
referent. Behind these problems we find a fundamental question: are definite descriptions 
best represented as incomplete symbols in disguise, or as semantically ambiguous 
between a quantificational reading and a referential reading? Unificationists maintain that 
definite descriptions are better represented as general propositions, while ambiguity 
theorists claim that we need to distinguish the logical form of attributive and referential 
cases and treat the latter as expressing singular propositions. 
 The ambiguity thesis was clearly presented for the first time by Saul Kripke (1975), 
who rejected it, "accommodating" the difference between referential and attributive uses, 
proposed by Donnellan (1966), by means of the distinction between speaker's reference 
and semantic reference. Neale (1990, 71, 106) claimed that the debate lacks real 
substance and that the Russellian analysis is basically correct for both attributive and 
referential uses. His claim has been smoothened in various subsequent papers, partly 
thanks to the new defence of the ambiguity thesis put forward by Michael Devitt, who 
has provided many arguments against the unificationist claim. I will work at the 
intersection of the three problems listed above, defending a unificationist view coherent 
with Russell and interpreting definite descriptions as expressions of general propositions 
even in the case of referential uses. In the following I will first define what I mean by 
“essentially” incomplete descriptions, and then I will focus on referential uses of definite 
descriptions. The main point of my paper will concern the referential uses of 
misdescriptions as a test case that any theory of definite descriptions has to deal with. The 
solution to referential uses of definite misdescriptions will prove to be a unified solution 
to attributive and referential uses of definite descriptions. 
 
 
1. Essentially incomplete descriptions 
 
An incomplete DD is a description that does not specify a condition sufficient to identify 
a single object, because the property used in the description attaches to more than one 
individual, unless some further specification is given. Typical examples discussed in the 
literature are descriptions like "the table" or "the guy", where it is clear that more than 
one table or one guy exist. There are three main cases of incompleteness:  
(i) the description is incomplete because of the implicit domain: we need to restrict the 
domain of interpretation to a “local” domain (there are many tables in the world, but only 
one in my room; there are many dogs in the world, but only one is in the neighbourhood);  
(ii) the description is incomplete because of the implicit point of view: there is more than 
one item which satisfies the description in the already restricted domain, but the speaker 
and the hearer have access to it through some intended specifications; for instance, there 
                                                
2 Including anthology of Reimer & Bezuidenhout (2004), the 2005 issue of Mind dedicated to Russell’s 
theory, and the 2007 issue of EuJAP dedicated to the definite descriptions.  
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may be more than one dog in the neighbourhood, but it is clear that I am referring to my 
dog;  
(iii) the description is incomplete because of its approximation or granularity; for instance 
"the nearest object" may concern something depending on the goal of the discourse or on 
the kind of tools to be used, like hands or pincers of a microrobot. 
 Incomplete definite descriptions seem to be the most common kinds of definite 
descriptions, as Bach (2004a) claims. Using these common cases we may give a 
definition of "incompleteness" according to the fact that most definite descriptions 
require some kind of contextual specification. Therefore not only descriptions like  "the 
table" or "the guy", but also descriptions like "the present king of France", "the man 
drinking a martini" – to cite some of the most well known examples – can be considered 
"incomplete" from this wider point of view. They are in need of some completion, be it a 
specification of the context of utterance, of the context of interpretation, of the domain, or 
of properties that help to disambiguate the intended referent. As defined above, 
incomplete definite descriptions can be used to refer to different individuals not only 
depending on the time of utterance, but also depending on the speaker's or hearer's 
interpretation, or their respective cognitive access. For instance, “the present King of 
France” may refer to different individuals depending on the time of the utterance.3  
 I shall therefore speak of "essentially incomplete description" as a reminder of a 
general aspect of definite descriptions, their context dependence:  
 
E.I.D.  Definite descriptions almost always require some contextual element to 
identify the unique individual they are supposed to refer to. Without the 
completion of a contextual element, definite  descriptions may refer to 
more than one individual.  
 
What is to be understood by "contextual element" will be defined more clearly later. If 
incomplete definite descriptions become the leading paradigm of definite descriptions, 
then a proper treatment of incomplete descriptions may lead us to the proper treatment of 
definite descriptions, generally speaking.  
 
 
2.  The “template” approach and the problem of misdescriptions 
 
The discussion of incomplete descriptions presents a great divide: firstly, some (such as 
Schiffer 2005) deny the viability of a Russellian treatment, while others claim that, with 
some restrictions, a Russellian treatment is ”basically correct” (see Neale 1990, 71, 106 
and Neale 2005). The aim of this paper is to support the second stance, while criticizing 
the details used to support it. Inside the second camp we find a contrast between implicit 
and explicit approaches, giving different logical forms to the definite descriptions. The 
explicit approach treats the logical form of an assertion containing an incomplete 
description as follows:  
 
                                                
3 As Russell 1957 implicitly accepted, speaking of egocentricity, that is dependence on where, when and by 
whom the sentence is uttered (the adjective “present”, in “the present King of France”, apparently depends 
on the time of the utterance). 
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(EA) [the x: Fx & Hx] Gx 
 
where "H" is a completion which disambiguates the incomplete definite description. The 
completion can be considered as a result of an implicature; "Fx" is what is said, and "Fx 
& Hx" is what the speaker intends to communicate. 
 According to the implicit approach there is no need to express a completion 
explicitly, given that speakers normally understand the incomplete definite description 
while sharing the presuppositions given by the conversational context (among which 
there is a restricted domain of quantification). What – in the explicit approach – is given 
by a completing property is here given by the context. We might summarize the implicit 
approach as follows: 
 
(IA) in Context C: [the x: Fx] Gx 
 
Leaving to a later paragraph the development of my proposal, which is more similar to an 
implicit approach, I will discuss here the advantages and shortcomings of the explicit 
approach. One of the best defences of the explicit approach is based on the increasingly 
widespread idea of using incomplete logical forms, or schemata, templates, blueprints 
(similar views have been proposed in different ways by Recanati (2001) Bach (2004b), 
Neale (2004), Soames (2008) and others. Buchanan and Ostertag (2005) follow this track; 
developing an idea of Blackburn (1988), they remark that in using an incomplete DD a 
speaker – if questioned about his communicative intentions – may give different 
responses expressing several propositions he almost or nearly meant. In their example, 
saying "the guy is late" a speaker may offer many different descriptions of the guy in 
question ("the guy we are waiting for", "the author of so and so", and so on). Buchanan 
and Ostertag's main point is that, given that there is no single proposition the speaker 
intends to convey, and the context does not provide a specific one among the many 
possible propositions which could be accepted as explication, we should still express 
something determinate that the speaker wants to convey through her "sloppy meaning 
intentions": if a speaker means something “sloppily”, she intends to induce any one of a 
number of responses in the hearer "without regard to which particular one of those 
responses is produced" (Buchanan and Ostertag 2005, 903).4 Therefore a proper version 
of (EA) should rely on a propositional template or blueprint, where no specific 
completion property is indicated, but any acceptable one can fill the empty slot: 
 
(EA*) [the x: Fx & _x] Gx 
 
                                                
4 This kind of proposal claims that no proposition is expressed, but many possible propositions are 
derivable. The idea of having many propositions in a single context is developed in a different way in the 
framework of the “multipropositionalism” of Korta-Perry (2008). Following Perry's ideas, an utterance is 
considered as having systematically a variety of contents (sets of truth-conditions) with varying degrees of 
reflexivity that are relevant to explain issues of cognitive motivation and impact of utterances. The 
difference from Buchanan and Ostertag is that Korta and Perry do not claim that no proposition is 
expressed, but that more than one proposition is expressed (depending on the goals of speakers and 
hearers). While not rejecting multipropositionalism, the attention of this paper is on the “official” content or 
“referential” content, that is the traditional truth conditional content of an assertion. 
5 
This proposal is based on a broadly Gricean point of view (the communicated proposition 
is not stated, but implicated); however, contrary to Grice, there is no proper literal 
proposition which is "said", because a template is not evaluable as true or false. The 
solution – the authors claim – relies on an understanding of the linguistic meaning of the 
sentence-type, and on mutual knowledge of the relevant contextual facts. If this solution 
works, it would be an answer to Shiffer's criticism of a Russellian treatment of 
incomplete definite descriptions. Shiffer 2005 shows the difficulties of a Russellian 
analysis of incomplete descriptions, but his criticism does not take into account this new 
form of Russell-like analysis developed with template solutions. 
 However, it seems to me that there is a blind spot which the template approach 
cannot overcome; in fact the solution seems unable to explain the referential uses of 
misdescriptions like "her husband is kind to her" (but he is actually her lover), "Smith's 
murderer is insane" (but he is actually innocent), "the man drinking champagne over 
there" (but he is actually drinking sparkling water). Assuming that these misdescriptions 
too are "essentially incomplete", we would need a completing property, according to the 
template solution. However, in cases of misdescriptions, where the property under 
consideration does not properly fit the individual object (or person) referred to – 
Buchanan’s rendering of the definite description “[the x: Fx & _x] Gx”  will  interpret the 
sentence as false for any completing property, because the first part of the template, "Fx", 
yields a property which does not fit the intended referent. This solution therefore cannot 
answer the problem raised by Donnellan (1966), according to whom we have to explain 
how it may happen that we say something true, even in case of misdescription. Taking the 
example of a person saying “her husband is kind to her” mistakenly referring to a 
spinster’s lover, Donnellan comments that “there is no reason to suppose that he (the 
speaker) has not said something true or false about him (the lover), even though he is not 
the lady’s husband” (1966, 257).  
 My first conclusion then is that Buchanan's solution, devised to solve the problem of 
incomplete descriptions, is unable to deal with misdescriptions. We cannot make any use 
of this template solution to justify referential uses of misdescriptions: as in the standard 
Russell perspective they just all become false, and the fact that they usually work in 
communication remains a mystery. If we want to defend a unificationist stance which 
claims that definite descriptions are better represented as incomplete symbols in disguise, 
then we need to solve the problem of the proper treatment of incomplete misdescriptions.5 
 
 
                                                
5 A “unificationist” attempt to solve this problem is provided by Soames (2008), who tries to explain how 
we can have referential uses of misdescriptions which say something true. According to Soames the literal 
interpretation of a misdescription as “the man drinking champagne is a famous philosopher”  (while he 
drinks mineral water) entails an enriched proposition as (1) [the x: x is a man &… &  x = m] x is a famous 
philosopher. (1) entails (2) m is a famous philosopher. This last proposition is true (provided that m is a 
famous philosopher), and Soames concludes that we may say something true although our assertion is 
literally false, and “the fact that the speaker has, strictly speaking, asserted one or more falsehoods will 
matter less than his having asserted an important truth.” In doing so, Soames succeeds also in deriving a 
singular true proposition from a general proposition, a derivation that was the most difficult challenge 
posed to the unificationists by Devitt. However the solution has some disadvantages: it multiplies 
propositions beyond necessity and asks us to rely on a mysterious way in which the “intended denotation” 
of a misdescription enters the picture: there is no clue as to how we get the intended “m”, but rather a 
postulation. 
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3.  Devitt, Almog and misdescriptions 
 
A possible alternative to the unificationist solution is the “ambiguity stance”, according to 
which definite descriptions have an ambiguous status between a quantificational reading 
and a (directly) referential reading. An explanation of the referential reading therefore 
becomes prominent in the debate. One of the main arguments for the ambiguity theory is 
Devitt's claim that there are standard uses of referential descriptions where the hearer 
directly grasps who the referent is – without the need to resort to an implicature, as is 
typically claimed on the side of unificationists.6 The reason behind this is the following: it 
is not simply that we can use a description referentially, but that we regularly do so; this 
regularity is strong evidence that there is a convention of using 'the F' to express a thought 
about a particular object (Devitt 2004, 283). Besides, referential descriptions behave like 
complex demonstratives, and what counts is the causal link to the object referred to. 
When I say “the table is covered with books” the description “the table” is – like “that 
table” – referential “and so it does not depend for its reference on a unique description, 
but rather on a perceptual causal link.” Referential descriptions, that is descriptions 
whose meaning is contributed directly by the referent, are the best explanation of 
referential uses of description and may explain the use of incomplete descriptions.   
 However, Devitt assumes a very cautious attitude towards the case of 
misdescriptions. Let us again consider the remark “her husband is kind to her” said with 
reference to the lover of a spinster. Even if “her husband” is a clear case of referential 
use, we have here a case – according to Devitt – where the truth or falsity of the remark 
depends on the speaker having in mind somebody who has the property of being a 
husband. Hence, even if truth conditions are unaffected by ignorance and error in case of 
incomplete descriptions, a referential use of definite descriptions must guarantee that “the 
object in mind” has the property given in the description (Devitt 2004, 302). Donnellan’s 
intuition is therefore partly rejected and difficult to explain.7  
 A somewhat different solution is proposed by Almog (2004, forthcoming), who 
shares with Devitt the idea of referential descriptions generating singular propositions, 
but with a particular novelty: according to Almog referential descriptions behave like 
logically proper names; therefore there seems to be no problem in also using 
misdescriptions to refer to the object we have in mind. The point is that, in referential 
uses, definite descriptions have the function of expressing a singular thought about an 
object, which depends on the perceptual cognitive link which antecedes the linguistic 
means I may use to refer to the object. What counts then is the causal cognitive chain – a 
brute worldly fact – which connects the referent to the speaker. This strategy is centred 
on the role of the fixation of the reference from the object to the mind. Once the object is 
                                                
6 It is to be noted however that Neale & Ludlow (2006) express doubts about the use of Gricean 
implicatures: they claim that the typical derivation using Grice's schema is at most an ex post facto 
justification, and does not provide an explanation of how or why a hearer infers what the speaker intends to 
communicate. 
7 Devitt 2004 (footnote 25) attempts to recover Donnellan’s intuition saying that there is a tension arising 
from the speaker having done something right and something wrong; the tension should dissolve saying 
“the F is causally grounded in an object that F does not apply to”. It is not clear however which is the 
referent of “the F” in Devitt’s proposal; for, being causally grounded in an object that F does not apply to, 
the F cannot be the husband, because there is no causal link with the husband; and it cannot be the lover, 
because the truth conditions of the sentence are linked to the object being an F.  
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fixed, I intend to communicate by some conventional means, and I may use either an 
indexical or a proper name or some predicative information useful for the hearer’s 
understanding – and even a misdescription can be used to perform this expressive 
function.  
 Almog (forthcoming) insists on separating two problems: the problem of “who is 
spoken of” and the problem of “why certain predicates are used to communicate about 
her”. However, giving more attention to the first than to the second problem, Almog runs 
the risk of missing the central role of the descriptive part of the misdescriptions; but the 
role of the descriptive part of a misdescription will be, in my treatment, the key to make 
Russell’s theory compatible with the referential uses of misdescriptions. Following Bach 
(2004a), we should start with the fact that, even in a misdescription, the descriptive part 
helps in identifying the referent in at least two ways (i) the hearer may think the object 
fits the description, or (ii) the hearer may think that the speaker believes so. There must 
be some unique thing that has – or is believed to have – the property F and that the 
speaker intends to refer to.8  
 The provisional conclusion of this is the following: for a proper use of a referential 
definite description it is not enough for the speaker to be in a causal perceptual link to 
some object; it is necessary to provide the hearer with the means to guide him or her to 
the intended referent using the descriptive part of the definite description. How might we 
better define the cognitive access to the object given through an incomplete definite 
(mis)description? We turn now to this point. 
 
 
4. Justifying descriptions: an epistemic approach 
 
If we want to avoid the blind-spot of the treatment of misdescription in the template 
solutions (§2) and overcome the shortcomings of alternative approaches to referential 
descriptions which do not sufficiently take into account the predicate used in the 
descriptive part (§3), we need what I call an “epistemic normative approach” to definite 
descriptions. This approach will give definite descriptions their intended interpretation as 
incomplete symbols following Russell, while allowing an answer to Donnellan’s 
intuitions.  
 The first step of my strategy is to support the claim that, even in referential uses of a 
description, the descriptive part has a fundamental role as “default attribution”. 
Referential uses of definite descriptions are an alternative to indexicals and proper names 
even in praesentia of the intended object, mainly in case of: (i) ambiguity of the scene 
where an indexical or demonstrative is not enough, (ii) ignorance of the proper name by 
the audience or speaker, (iii) rules of politeness when the use of a demonstrative is not 
                                                
8 Bach (2007) claims that the speaker does not use "the F" as elliptical for "the F I have in mind"; more 
specifically he must expect the hearer to have cognitive access to the object. What does Bach mean by 
cognitive access? Bach (2007, 40) speaks of triangulation; but speaking of triangulation here seems to me 
to restate in different jargon the need – as insisted on by Devitt and Almog – of sharing the same causal 
chain. I think this is true, but it is not enough to defend a unificationist stance; the sharing of the causal 
chain is not enough to define a “cognitive” path, and it is only its possible premise; we need to rely on the 
role of the predicate used in the description, to differentiate it from other means like demonstratives and 
indexicals.  
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appropriate or the name is too confidential. Given this setting, we may assume that in a 
normal conversation we use a “default requirement”: 
(DR) the property used in a definite description to identify an individual in a 
scene or situation is a default property, a "likelihood" property, or a 
very probable property given the situation. 
 
 Speaking of default9 or “likelihood”, we stress the need, for any suitable use of DD, 
of a link with relevant information in the wide context and the lexicon used, such that the 
audience uses the content of the description as a cognitive path to render the object 
referred to salient in the context. If somebody says "the table is covered with books" in a 
hall full of tables covered with books, without any clue as to which table is relevant, he 
does not express any semantically evaluable proposition, and he does not express "the 
proposition he has in mind", that is the one concerning the table he is referring to in his 
solipsistic privacy. The speaker would be excluded from the linguistic community 
because he demands too much effort of imagination on the part of the hearer, going far 
beyond what is required by a general equilibrium of cognitive effort.10 There is a social 
obligation that the proposition a speaker has in mind must be coherent with the 
proposition which is accessible to the audience. How? A principle of charity will help, 
that is introducing a normative and epistemic element into the overall picture of using or 
interpreting definite descriptions: we may identify what is said with the help of a definite 
description of what a speaker should say given certain contextual restrictions (such as 
limited information), maximizing the rationality of speaker and hearer. 
 A second step in my argument is to better define the role of the inferential part of the 
lexicon in helping the hearer to identify the intended reference. It is easy to see that a 
characteristic of the default restriction is that, in case of a “literally false” definite 
description, there are always some elements that are rationally usable by a speaker for 
identification. Let us again take the example of “her husband is kind to her” said referring 
to a spinster’s lover. How can a hearer interpret the sentence, given the situation in  
which a man is being kind to the only woman in the scene? Here we need to rely on the 
default requirement (DR): "husband" has some default properties among which are: to be 
officially married, to have some intimacy with the partner and so on. Given limited 
information, a speaker may use the term "husband" without proper knowledge of marital 
status, but relying on the typical properties which are embedded in the inferential net of 
the relevant fragment of a semantic network (like "if x is y’s husband then x takes care of 
y" or “if x is an y’s husband then x behaves intimately with y”).11 Briefly, in identifying 
                                                
9 There is some similarity between my approach and that of Jaszczolt (2002) when she speaks of “default 
semantics” as giving an underspecified sense that comes before semantic interpretation (247ss). However, 
the details of Jaszczolt (2005) on definite descriptions give a general strategy for privileging referential 
descriptions as given by merged representations, where there is not enough consideration for the specific 
inferential role of the predicate.  
10 I am referring to the requirements imposed by relevance theorists (Sperber-Wilson), without the need to 
accept every detail of their theory.  
11 I mean here to refer to the stereotype of “husband”, of what a husband should be, more than on the actual 
behaviour. Certainly husbands are often ugly and unfair; but people get married because they still believe 
that husbands have certain duties (among which behaving with a loving attitude to wives). Is all this 
embedded in the lexicon? I refer here to the traditional setting of treating concepts like frames or scripts, 
which is something with a rich environment of typical inferential relations. Partly following Bach’s idea of 
a first “normal” meaning, and then a “stereotypical” meaning I assume that – when needed – a lexical 
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the relevant person in the scene the speaker should use the inferential aspects of the 
lexicon provided by the descriptive part of the definite description plus the information 
given by the scene or the situation. The hearer may, in this way, reconstruct the cognitive 
path that led the speaker to use that particular definite description in that context.12  
 We may conclude that the inferential surrounding of a lexical term used in a definite 
misdescription is always relevant, by default, to providea proper cognitive path needed to 
give the intended referent. We may call this the epistemic normative stance:  
 
(ENS) the intended reference must not only be coherent with the shared 
presuppositions, but also with shared knowledge of language, i.e. with 
inferential default information attached to the relevant lexical items. 
The intended referent is the individual to whom we are justified – in 
normal conditions and given our limited knowledge – to attribute the 
property expressed, given that some of the collateral properties 
associated to the lexical item are activated. Therefore the intended 
reference is what should be understood from what is said in the context. 
 
From this we define – as the third step of our strategy – what can be called the linguistic 
meaning or “character” of a definite description, in analogy with the idea of character as a 
function from context to content:13 the linguistic meaning of a definite description can be 
defined as    
 
       ©   The unique individual which a speaker in a context – given basic 
default justifications – should be referring to by the use of the 
descriptive predicate.  
 
Given (ENS) and the definition © of the character of definite descriptions, we may now 
understand why I have defined this stance as “epistemic” and “normative”. It is epistemic 
because it involves justification and it is normative because it deals not with actual 
                                                                                                                                            
element is by default connected with its immediate inferential surroundings, its stereotypical frame (the set 
of inferences “nearer” to the lexical item; a simplification might be reasoning in the context of a semantic 
network system like KLONE kinds). 
12 When the speaker or the hearer come to know that the woman is unmarried, they may still use the 
definite description as a rigidifying definite description as in (“her husband is, in fact, the lover”) or 
referring to the definite description as a part of a wrong belief (as in “the one you believe to be her husband 
is her lover”). In any case, all dialogues testify that the misdescription has been correctly understood as 
intended to identify the intended referent, through our default restriction (DR). Two possible replies are 
described by Kripke (1975) to update the mistaken belief of the speaker who said “her husband is kind to 
her”: (1) “No, he isn’t. The man you are referring to isn’t her husband” (2) He is kind to her, but he isn’t the 
husband”. According to Kripke, the first reply identifies the semantic reference while the second the 
speaker’s referent. However, both show that the hearer understands which individual has been referred to 
by the speaker by means of the definite description.  
13 Almog (2004, 414 ff) proposes a treatment of definite descriptions as contextuals relying basically on the 
causal perceptual chain. The main difference from his proposal is the central role given her to the broader 
concept of justification, which relies heavily of the content of the predicative part of the description. 
Sainsbury (2004, 380) hints at a similar suggestion for the referential use of definite description in the form 
of an axiom. However, in doing so, he allows no space for a strategy that permits a unified treatment of 
attributive and referential uses, and then he derives from the axiom a consequence of semantic ambiguity.  
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psychological processes, but with what should be considered as a default justification 
given our limited knowledge of a situation. 
 The fourth step of my strategy is to present a picture of how these elements may fit 
the format of a general proposition according to the unificationist’s desires. I am 
suggesting that the meaning of a DD – that is the linguistic rule which permits us to 
derive the content given a context – must be constrained by some normative epistemic 
procedure. It is not enough to speak – as Buchanan-Ostertag (2005) do – of "sloppy 
intentions", but we should attempt to devise the procedures through which those sloppy 
intentions can actually be communicated to the hearer. Instead of having a propositional 
template with an empty space, we will have a different structure, which assumes the 
above definition of the meaning of a definite description with the following format: 
  
in Ci: [the x: Δ Fx] Gx 
 
Here  [the x: Δ  Fx] means "the individual having the property F by default justification in 
the context". While vindicating Donnellan's original intuitions (the speaker is saying 
something true), this format vindicates a quantificational and Russellian treatment of 
referential definite descriptions.14 A misdescription will come out true by default, which 
means – if the description is “well done” – it will succeed in getting the intended 
reference, although it would always be liable to be falsified (and this is what happens for 
most of our assertions). To follow our example: “her husband”, said by a speaker in the 
context, is interpreted as referring to the individual whom the speaker is justified to 
believe to be the husband. Our problem is then to define how this justification can be 
given; to do that we need to re-define our notion of context and to better define the “Δ”, 
which stands for the justification procedure.  
  
 
5. A procedural approach to the notion of context  
 
According to Neale & Ludlow (2006, 829) there is no hope of resolution of the debate on 
a Russellian analysis of referential uses of descriptions without some progress in defining 
context, anaphora and other related issues. Although some aspects of my proposal could 
find a reasonable place inside the standard (Kaplanian) semantic setting,15 I will present 
                                                
14 Neale's idea to treat referential uses of DD as Gödelians like Ex (Fx.x=a.Gx) does not work properly, 
unless interpreted as a referential description in Devitt's sense. Where does "a" come from? If it is just what 
the speaker has in mind, and we have no clue  to give to the hearer to identify it. But if we use ι(x) Δ F(x), 
here Δ is a procedure which does not indicate just "what the speaker has in mind", but what the speaker 
should have in mind, given the general presuppositions (if this does not work, it means that the speaker is 
not successful in communicating). 
15 An attempt within the Kaplanian setting can be found in Predelli (2000), who works on the parameters of 
the circumstance of evaluation as a way to provide the intended content (anticipating the contemporary 
discussion on relativism based on the different interpretations provided by the context of utterance and the 
circumstances of evaluation). In the case of "her husband is kind to her" (and similar cases) the possible 
world in which the definite description is evaluated is not the same as the possible world of the context of 
utterance (where there may be no husband, or the husband may be different from the intended referent). 
Briefly we might identify the possible world of the circumstance of evaluation as the possible world of the 
narration intended by the person uttering that particular sentence. The possible world of the narration of the 
11 
my ideas within a different tradition developed in symbolic artificial intelligence, mainly 
in contextual reasoning.16 Contextual reasoning is relevant in our case given that it works 
with the network of inferences and rules of inference – and inferential competence is a 
fundamental aspect of lexical competence.17 I will not offer any formalised setting, but 
just some general intuitions, using a picture of wide context or situation as a setting 
where an assertion is made under a set of parameters. 
 Lewis, discussing the concept of context envisaged by Kaplan, pointed out that an 
index can be constituted not only of <speaker, time, location> but of anything that can 
switch. What does it mean to put anything that can switch into our definition ofindex? 
Following Lewis, we may look for a wider set of contextual parameters, but we run the 
risk of ending up with an endless list, and rendering the definition intractable. We need 
therefore to find some way to group the parameters, that is to give some classification of 
the different ways the context of utterance may constrain the interpretation of a 
sentence.18 Taking a suggestion from Bouquet (2000), Guha–McCarthy (2003) and 
Author (2005), I will use three categories to provide a hierarchy among parameters:  
(i) partiality  
(ii) perspective (or viewpoint)  
(iii) approximation.  
 These three kinds of parameters map the three classical cases of incompleteness for 
definite descriptions described in §1 of this essay: (i) partiality deals mainly with domain 
restriction and the language used; time and location are the first parameters used to 
restrict the domain, but we may need more specific information to make the domain 
restriction more precise; (ii) perspective, or viewpoint, deals with demonstratives, 
indexicals and with speaker's and hearer's presuppositions or beliefs; (iii) approximation 
deals with the level of granularity or the scale used (if I am dealing with tables I don't 
normally care about subatomic particles, but if I’m dealing with atoms I do). We might 
think that this last parameter is just an entry for the definition of the domain; however, its 
pervasive role in treating vagueness gives it such a central role that it seems appropriate 
to accord it a proper space (we might call it a "sharpening" parameter, as in many 
treatments of vague predicates). 
 Are these the only relevant kinds of parameters? Do people really use them? 
Certainly the classification is a rational reconstruction of how speakers would answer if 
                                                                                                                                            
speaker in the above mentioned case is a possible world where the husband is identical to the relevant man 
in the scene. 
16 Perry 1998 and McCarthy 1999 represent responses to Van Benthem’s request to specify their visions of 
context. McCarthy’s conception is more similar to a cognitive content (or set of beliefs, or common 
ground), but this is compatible with the general treatment of context defined by parameters, plus a set of 
beliefs (axioms), a language and accepted inference rules. I don’t want to work on the difference between 
the standard philosophical approach and the computer science approach (for such a comparison see for 
instance Author 1999). I am interested here just in the possibility of using a treatment of context which is 
free of strict links with the standard semantic treatment given by Kaplan. The metaphor of a context as a 
box is used by Bouquet et alia 2000, and I will use it freely as a tool for simplifying the expository aspect.  
17 See Marconi 1997. 
18 Among the attempts to give such a classification, Recanati 2004a distinguishes obligatory and derogatory 
cases; his classification, however, does not refer, strictly speaking, to contextual parameters, but to kinds of 
pragmatic attitudes like enrichment, loosening and transfer, which depend on contextual parameters. My 
point is that we need a general framework to define which kinds of parameters are needed to trigger these 
pragmatic attitudes.  
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challenged to justify their use of definite descriptions. Perhaps we might find other more 
suitable classifications; however the main point is that we need an order of parameters to 
give an idea of how to compute the content of an assertion and its semantic value.  
 Let a context be represented as a box in which we have assertions whose 
interpretation depends on the three sets of parameters outside the box. The parameters 
may shift, depending on which context is taken into consideration. For instance, if the 
parameter “speaker” in the viewpoint is activated as “Carlo”, inside the box we might 
have “I am tired”; but if we change context, we may express a proposition with the same 
truth conditions saying: “Carlo is tired”. If the parameter “time” in the domain restriction 
is fixed to “December 25”, inside the box we may have “today is a nice day”, but, if we 
change context, we may also have the time expressed inside the box as “On December 25 
it is a nice day”. 
 With this in mind, we may better define our "Δ" operator given in the previous 
paragraph. “Δ” may be interpreted as a procedure19 for extracting parameters from the 
context, by running through the three dimensions. The “Δ” procedure should extract the 
parameters needed to get the most plausible default interpretation of the content of an 
assertion. Applied to a definite description, the procedure should work according to the 
epistemic normative stance (ENS). Given our definition of the “character” of definite 
descriptions, the “Δ” is a procedure which connects the property used to refer to a unique 
individual (given by the definite article) with the parameters which help to fix that unique 
individual. The starting point of our procedure is then the intersection of the descriptive 
predicate and its surrounding inferential environment, with information from the wide 
context that restricts the possible interpretations.  
 I’ll try here to give a picture of what it means to “activate” the “Δ” factor: let a box 
be connected with the three kinds of parameters (p = partiality, v = viewpoint, a = 
approximation) and let a procedure run through the three different parameters until a 
reasonable default solution is reached. 
 
   p, v, a 
  
    Her husband is kind to her. 
 
 
A competent hearer, sharing a basic mastery of contextual parameters, may be 
represented as if he were applying them one after the other to arrive at “what is said” by 
the speaker, according to a procedure of the kind: 
 
1) Parameter partiality (restricting the domain): 
"the F" = "there is an x which is the only x in the restricted domain which is an F" 
(if not clear skip to 2)  
                                                
19 Generally speaking the procedural aspect of our proposal is part of the architecture of the performance 
system, and it belongs to pragmatics in performing the role of filtering semantic interpretation. A more 
traditional procedural aspect of meaning can be found in the role given to the inferential connections of the 
lexicon. Even if it has no direct link with other paradigms, it may be connected with the spirit of the 
procedural semantic analysis as given in Jespersen 2005, who presents a logical treatment of referential 
definite descriptions such as “Smith’s murderer”. 
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2) Parameter viewpoint or perspective (situating the predicate epistemically and 
normatively): 
"the F" = "there is an x which the speaker is justified to believe is an F" 
(if not clear skip to 3)  
3) Parameter approximation (specializing step 1 or 2): 
"the F" = "there is an x which the speaker is justified to believe is an F given a lower 
level of approximation  
[given by lexical (inferential) information conveyed by the linguistic expression and basic 
information supposed to be shared by the speakers] 
 
In step 1) we cannot reach a conclusion because, assuming that the scene contains more 
than one man, the restricted domain of quantification does not suffice to isolate an 
individual; in step 2) – unless it were a shared presupposition – we may think we are not 
justified to believe the individual is an husband, lacking explicit evidence of the fact; in 
3) we may relax the precision with which we attribute a property, and be content with the 
inferential surrounding of the lexical item.20  
 The definition of the meaning of definite descriptions as a function from context to 
content may help to give a unified treatment of attributive and referential use. In cases of 
attributive uses of definite descriptions, the default procedure stops at the first step, of the 
domain restriction; for instance, “the present King of France” stops with a falsity if the 
domain is the one including present-day kings (unless some further refinement is given if 
the sentence is used as a metaphor or in historical narration). Or “her husband is kind to 
her” is false if the intended domain is the domain of “legal” husbands. In referential uses 
the domain is restricted to objects with which the speaker entertains a direct epistemic 
relation (a perceptual or causal link). In saying that most definite descriptions are context 
dependent, we also mean that we have to filter at least the domain of interpretation. 
 What, then, is the logical form of a definite description? Shall we follow an explicit 
or an implicit approach? This contraposition in our case does not work properly. In fact, 
on the one hand, in always leaving room for the context, we are assuming a kind of 
implicit approach; on the other hand, in inserting a symbol for a procedure associated 
with the logical form it seems that we are nearer to the explicit approach. The difference 
between the standard explicit approach and our approach is that in the former the symbol 
“H” stands for a completing property, while in the latter the “Δ” is not a symbol for a 
property, but a symbol for a procedure, which should run through contextual parameters. 
To present it in the form of a slogan, I should say that we have a pragmatically filtered 
semantic interpretation: what is semantically expressed by a misdescription is true, under 
pragmatic or epistemic restrictions. 
 Giving a very brief comparison with other ideas in contemporary debate, this 
proposal could be expressed by saying that I extend what minimalists would call “the 
                                                
20 The strategy so defined for restricting intended interpretations apparently is not linked just to definite 
descriptions, but may have a wide range of cases, with different steps; for instance we may stop at level 1) 
in the typical cases of local domains like “all dogs are barking”, while we need to go to step 2) for cases 
like “I have nothing to wear”, or to go to step 3) in cases like “the ham sandwich went away without 
paying”. We may therefore see that the kind of general strategy could be a way to treat typical situations of 
free enrichment or loosening. 
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basic set”, which they see as limited to indexicals, to definite descriptions.21 Given that 
the “Δ” procedure is considered as a proper part of the logical form of a definite 
description, it might seem that its role is similar to what would be a hidden articulate 
constituent for indexicalists;22 but it is not exactly so; in fact the “Δ” is not a place for a 
bound variable in the syntax, but a place for a procedure which uses the lexicon to 
activate different kinds of parameters when needed, until it reaches a stop. Another 
similarity might be found between our “Δ” procedure with the “counts as” of relativists;23 
however idea of “counts as” requires a split between the context of utterance and the 
circumstances of evaluation, while the procedure I am considering works directly on the 
context of utterance. 
 From a more general philosophical point of view this proposal sounds not too 
dissimilar from the Davidsonian picture of conversation as convergence between two 
passing theories (speaker and hearer rely on their knowledge of the lexicon plus the 
situation), but supplemented with a strategy guided by pragmatic rules of partiality, 
perspective and approximation (Author 200X). Davidson (1986) was speaking of the 
"mystery" of the strategy by which we converge towards the same meanings. There is no 
mystery: the rich inferential structure of the lexicon gives inputs for activating procedures 
which run through kinds of contextual parameters to provide cognitive access to the 
intended referent and to what the speaker says and means. In this way we may vindicate 
both Donnellan's and Russell's intuitions, and avoid the "ambiguity thesis". In fact "her 
husband is kind to her" can be considered as shorthand for a more boring "the person the 
speaker rationally believes to be her husband – given the evidence in the lexicon and in 
the situation which justifies by default this property – is kind to her". And this is an 
expression of a true proposition.  
 
 
6. Post-script: challenges and answers  
 
In this paper I have suggested a procedural setting in which to define pragmatic rules for 
filtering semantic interpretation. The idea has been prompted by some dissatisfaction 
with many treatments of misdescriptions which seemed to me unable to answer the old 
challenge by Donnellan: how can we say something true even with an apparently false 
definite description?  
 As we saw in §2, Buchanan and Ostertag make it impossible to explain the success of 
misdescriptions in communicating something true because their rendering of the template 
solution makes all misdescriptions false under any interpretation. Though I maintain the 
idea of a treating incomplete definite descriptions with some kind of “sloppy intention”, 
instead of a “template” solution I use the standard Russellian logical form connected with 
a procedure and I take definite descriptions as functions from context to content; using 
definite descriptions as contextuals, my epistemic-normative treatment explains how a 
misdescription can be used to say something true in the context of utterance, given that – 
                                                
21 See Cappelen and Lepore 2005; the step is not so awkward given that personal pronouns, which belong 
to indexicals, are typically considered in linguistics as abbreviated definite descriptions (cfr. Neale 2005) 
22 See Stanley 2005 
23 See McFarlane 2007, 2009 
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typically – a misdescription is apt to make speaker and hearer converge on the intended 
referent, given the context.  
 As we saw in §3, Josep Almog tries to explain how we can use a misdescription to 
say something true, relying of our use of referential descriptions; however in doing so he 
runs the risk of completely cutting off the role of the descriptive part of the description, 
making the referential success in communication a mystery. On the contrary, in my 
account, I give a proper role also to the descriptive part, considering the role of the 
inferential aspects of the lexicon in giving default justifications for use of the lexical item 
in the context. In this way I succeed in explaining the success of the referential uses of 
misdescriptions, and at the same time give a unified treatment of definite descriptions, 
covering cases of both attributive and referential uses.  
 However my proposal has to face at least two objections: (i) it leaves the boundary 
between semantic and pragmatics unclear; (ii) it deals with psychology (cognition) and 
not with semantics. In the following I will offer some responses to these two challenges. 
 
(i) Does my treatment overlap semantic and pragmatic issues, without a clear 
identification of the boundaries between semantics and pragmatics? This is “the” as yet 
unresolved issue in the debate on the boundary betweens semantics and pragmatics.24 
Like many others, I reject the traditional idea according to which pragmatics enters after 
the definition of semantic content, with a qualification. The idea of filling the gaps of an 
incomplete description by means of a procedural operator which runs through the 
contextual parameters contains the claim that pragmatics should filter the semantic 
interpretation, and give the conditions for a correct compositionality. The result of a 
procedure of the kind I have proposed has nothing to do with an implicature, but gives the 
truth conditional content of what is said by means of a sentence in a context. Sentences 
alone don’t say anything, and their truth condition depends on the objects the sentence 
uttered in a context refers to. A semantic theory must capture the truth conditions of the 
things asserted, which are the things a hearer believes when he understands an assertion; 
this amounts to accepting that “whoever fully understands a declarative utterance knows 
which state of affairs would possibly constitute a truth maker for that utterance” 
(Recanati 2004, 49).  
 Given the assertion “her husband is kind to her”, what are the things asserted? Which 
state of affairs would possibly constitute a truth maker for that utterance? Only in a 
context does a sentence refer to some individual and the truth conditions of “her husband 
is kind to her” should be read as such: 
 
TC: “her husband is kind to her” is true in context C iff the individual denoted by “her 
husband” in the context is kind to the individual denoted by “her” in the context. 
 
 Given our limited knowledge, the intended referent is the individual who has the best 
chance of being described as such in the situation. We need to select the right individual 
in order to check the validity of further reasoning in the discourse, keeping track of 
anaphoric links. If we miss these links we miss the intended referent. It is too easy to say 
that the lady is a spinster and therefore the speaker refers to nobody; how then are we to 
understand what might follow in the conversation? Philosophers have often used 
                                                
24 See Bianchi 2004, Szabó 2005. 
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linguistic examples, isolating them from a discourse. But discourse is what permits us to 
keep track of the referents through anaphoric chains and check our previous guesswork 
on who the intended referent might be. In our semantic interpretation we need to identify 
the individual actually referred to by a definite description in context, and not a possible 
individual “stipulated” to be the metaphysical entity referred to. In using natural language 
we always engage in guesswork25 and therefore we are always liable to fail: we need to 
express our ability to understand what we say, keeping in mind the essential condition of 
uncertainty linked to language use. 
 Donnellan’s case is in fact the case of most of our descriptions: as most of our 
descriptions are “essentially incomplete”, they are often literally wrong under 
requirements for more precise and detailed justifications, or are at least liable to be either 
revisable or further specifiable. Unless we want to impose upon the semantics of natural 
language a metaphysical commitment beyond the epistemic capability of humans, we 
have to understand truth conditions as something we can obtain through language and 
context, with the typical default structure we constantly use in expressing our thoughts 
about individuals. Definite descriptions (both in referential and attributive uses), whose 
role is to refer to individuals, will almost always be approximated, and in need of 
contextual specification. Semantic interpretation does not come before pragmatic 
interpretation, but typically begins after we have decided the referents of our expressions 
(in a more traditional setting: after we have filled the index with values); this is the result 
of treating the semantics of natural language as dealing with how language is used, not 
with an unattainable metaphysical reality.  
 The ENS stance should give the default semantic content. This attitude is in tune with 
Recanati’s availability principle, according to which what is said “must be available, 
must be open to view” (see Recanati 2004, 49). However, the default semantic 
interpretation does not amount to “intuitive truth conditions” or “pragmatic truth 
conditions”, but to “pragmatically filtered semantic truth conditions26”: the procedure 
relies on objective facts of the situation and of the lexicon, and makes these facts interact 
to give the most plausible candidate for being the referent of our expressions. The 
filtering aims to give the default intended referent; once the referent is given, then we 
may check all other aspects of the sentence in discourse, such as anaphora and 
compositionality. Speaking of “default” truth conditions I am stressing the claim that the 
contextual filtering of truth conditions cannot be a deterministic procedure: context does 
                                                
25 I take from Frege the slogan of the necessity of “guesswork” in understanding natural language. Actually 
any guess may be revealed to be wrong, but can be easily accommodated. The fact that the individual 
described as “the husband” is not a husband is further information, which makes the description literally 
wrong, and requires a revision of the lexicon used, without missing the right link to the intended referent 
introduced by the reference fixing description (based on default information). But we may always have 
further information: for instance, we might be informed that the man we believed to be the husband is the 
lover; but later also that the man we believed to be the lover of the lady is actually the real husband in 
disguise, and so on. Semantics cannot deal with any possible revision; we have to rely on the basic core of 
the default use of our lexicon in normal situations, considering the essential condition of fallibility of any 
description. What counts is the ability to use the lexicon to render the correct referent salient in the context. 
26 Truth conditional pragmatics concerns elements that are not encoded in the linguistic expression used, 
but depend on pragmatic maxims (see for instance Carlston 2004, 73). Here the pragmatic procedure I 
suggest does not depend on pragmatic maxims and does not use implicature, but it is a search for what is 
encoded in the linguistic expression, considered as a part of the inferential structure of the lexicon used. 
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not determine what is said, but it constrains what speakers could reasonable say and 
hearers should reasonably understand.27 
 
(ii) Given that I am concerned with the problem of understanding, somebody might say 
that my attempt does not regard semantics, but is an attempt to give a psychological or 
cognitive explanation of the mental processes going on in communication. Recently Kent 
Bach discussed the ambiguity of the term “utterance interpretation”, as something in 
between a semantic interpretation (the mapping of sentence forms into linguistic 
meanings) and psychological processes (how listeners figure out what speakers are trying 
to communicate). There is nothing wrong with the latter kind of work; the main disaster 
occurs, however, when instead of treating the study of understanding as a psychological 
problem or a cognitive problem of devising the cognitive processes under analysis, 
people treat it “as if it were something more abstract, more akin to semantic 
interpretation”. I report the quotation in full:  
 
“Some philosophers and linguists treat utterance interpretation […] as if it 
were a mapping from syntactic structure to utterance contents, except that 
mapping is sensitive to broadly contextual factors. In doing so they seem 
to think that an utterance (as opposed to a sentence) can express things 
independently of what the speaker means in making it, just because of the 
context in which it is made. It is as if meanings could somehow be read off 
utterances independently of inferring the speaker’s intention, in a way 
analogous to semantic interpretation of sentences, but without the 
constraint of being a projection of syntactic structure.” (Bach 2004b, 35) 
 
My attempt belongs to the attitude of philosophers, who think of semantics as dealing 
with the problem of reference, and not only with linguistic meaning. There may be some 
terminological misunderstanding and some disagreement. If we distinguish truth 
theoretical semantics and theory of meaning,28 we maintain the distinction between the 
truth theoretical apparatus of formal semantics and the analysis of linguistic meaning 
(which is also called “semantics”). I have tried to give what may be defined as the 
“meaning” or “character” of definite descriptions as a “default meaning”, that is a 
procedure for extracting information from the lexicon, plus information from contextual 
elements, in order to define how the referents of our expressions are individuated. In 
doing so, I claim that the procedure gives both what a speaker should say to drive the 
audience towards the intended referent, and what a hearer should expect the speaker to 
mean; we cannot avoid connecting what is said with our understanding; but this does not 
amount necessarily to a study of our mental processes, as is done in psychology or 
cognitive studies. It is a higher-level abstract representation of the compatibility between 
what is linguistically expressed and what should be understood in a context. We are 
totally blind to the hidden intentions of a speaker unless the speaker says something 
                                                
27 The idea of pragmatic constraints on semantics is shared by many authors, among whom Bach 2004b, 35; 
Perry (forthcoming) and Soames (2008). However, the way in which pragmatics performs this job is a 
question of specification. The idea of the role of pragmatics as “filtering” semantic interpretation is the 
main proposal of this essay. 
28 See Vignolo 2009 
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understandable in context using inferences embedded in the lexicon and shared in the 
local situation. 
 Decades ago Barbara Hall Partee 1983 contrasted a mathematical semantics with a 
psychological semantics; I suggest that our theories of meaning can be something in 
between the two; they are an attempt to give a general framework of the structure of 
understanding. They are not psychology in disguise, although they must be coherent with 
psychological data. They must deal with the way we constrain semantic interpretation 
(truth conditions). Phenomena like free enrichment or loosening in this approach may 
become aspects of a more general treatment of contextual pragmatic filtering, which is a 
step that comes before semantic interpretation. Isn’t this a late legacy of the old Fregean 
idea that compositionality depends on contextuality?  
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